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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Taxation-Patents and Copyrights a, Immune Federal
Instrumentalities.
The doctrine that federal and state governmental instrumentalities
are reciprocally immune from taxation has been an elementary canon
since McCulloch v. Maryland.' It was there that Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall deduced from the Constitution by "necessary implication"
this principle considered necessary to preserve a governmental struc-
ture of dual sovereignties. "General propositions," however, "do
not decide concrete cases"; and two recent decisions which reach
different results in considering the effect of state taxes on the fed-
eral function of issuing patents and copyrights give further sanction
to this aphorism of Mr. Justice Holmes.
On January 12, 1931, the United States Supreme Court in Edu-
cational Firs Corp. v. Ward2 upheld the levy of a New York
franchise tax on corporations for the privilege of doing business,
although the tax was measured by net income made up in part from
the returns on copyrights. On March 25, 1931, the North Carolina
Supreme Court in Maxwell v. Chemikal Construction C&.3 refused
to uphold the levy of an income tax, because part of such income
was made up of royalties received from patents. The opinion relies
chiefly on Long v. Rockwood,4 a Federal Supreme Court case hold-
ing a similar tax invalid. The Attorney General, however, pointed
out that the Long case was a five to four decision. This he suggested
as a reason, especially strong in the light of the instant federal hold-
ing, for a decision in his favor.5 The argument was repudiated on
the ground that one was an income tax as contrasted with the other
as a franchise tax. Despite the form of the tax, in both cases there
is presented the fundamental problem of striking a practical and
workable balance between the interest of the state in unimpaired tax-
ing power and the interest of the federal government in the free
exercise of its power to "promote the progress of Science and Useful
Arts" 6 by issuing patents and copyrights. Cases involving the effect
of these types of taxes on other federal powers may throw light on
this problem.7
14 Wheat. 316 (1819).
'51 Sup. Ct. 170 (1931).
200 N. C. 500 (1931).
'277 U. S. 145, 48 Sup. Ct. 463, 72 L. ed. 824 (1928).
'Plaintiff Appellant's Brief, page 5.
1U. S. CONSTITUTIOi, Art. I, §8.
'For a discussion of the relation of other types of taxes to the encroach-
ment problem see the following which begins a series of articles: Thomas
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Incone Taxes.
Taxes on income derived from federal instrumentalities are con-
sistently declared invalid as hampering the operations of the federal
government. In Miller v. Milwaukee8 an income tax levied on cor-
porate dividends paid directly from United States bonds was de-
clared invalid as impairing the federal borrowing power. In Gillespie
v. Oklahoma9 the fact that part of the income consisted in profits
from a lease of Indian lands served.to invalidate the tax as interfer-
ing with the government's care of its wards. In neither case does
there appear any disposition to determine whether the interference is
negligible or substantial. In fact, the only reaction against a mechan-
ical and technical application of the doctrine of reciprocal exemption
in the income tax cases appears in the dissenting opinion of Holmes,
J., in Long v. Rockwood.1° He is willing to question whether pat-
ents are instrumentalities in the sense of the rule which forbids tax-
ation thereon. This willingness to face actualities is perhaps more
significant in the light of a long line of state cases holding patents
immune from various kinds of taxation. 1'
Corporate Franchise Taxes.
The corporate franchise tax cases are more numerous and their
history is more complex. The court has been reluctant to pierce the
form of a franchise tax and recognize its actual effect on a federal
instrumentality. And having perceived such an effect, it has not yet
expressly based a decision on the theory that the interference of the
Reed Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing
Powers of the States (1918) 31 HAav. L. Rxv. 321. See also Note (1930) 30
COL. L. REv. 92.
*272 U. S. 713, 47 Sup. Ct. 280, 71 L. ed. 487 (1927).
'257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171, 66 L. ed. 339 (1922). Holmes, J., differ-
entiates cases in which the state tax is claimed to burden interstate commerce
on the ground that they concern a regulatory power of the federal government
and not an instrumentality. In these 6ases interference, he says, is a question
of degree. On the other hand, "the rule as to instrumentalities of the United
Sifates is absolute in form and at least strictef-in substance." For an apparent
change in his view see infra note 22. In Oil Corp. v. Bass, 6 U. S. Daily 365
(1931) a federal -income tax on income from a lease of state lands was upheld.1
°Supra note 4.
Edison Electric Co. v. Board of Assessors, 156 N. Y. 417, 51 N. E. 269
(1898) (property tax) ; Commonwealth v. Westinghouse Co., 151 Pa. St. 265,
24 AtI. 1107 (1892) (tax on corporate capital invested in patents); Celotex
-Ce.-w Louisiana-Tax Commission, 165 La.-195, 115 So. 457 (1928) ; Common-
wealth v. Petty, 96 Ky. 452, 29 S. W. 291 (1895) (license tax on sale of pat-
ents) ; In re Sheffield, 64 Fed. 833 (C. C. Ky. 1894) (same) ; Quicksafe M'f'g.
Corp. v. Graham, 29 S. W. (2d) 253 (Tenn. 1930); and see McCullock v.
Maryland, supra note 1, at 432. Cf. Appeal of Ross, U. S. Daily, Sept. 2, 1930,
at 7 commented on in (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 136.
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state tax with the exercise of federal powers was not vitalbor sub-
stantial. In four early cases-three in 1867, one in 1889-the court
upheld state franchise taxes on corporations measured by a percent-
age of net income part of which was made up of returns from United
States securities. 12 The announced ground of the decisions was the
seemingly futile distinction between a tax on such income and a' tax
measured by it. In 1910 the same conceptualism resulted in uphold-
ing the levy in the converse situation of a federal franchise tax od
state corporations measured by net income derived in part from the
returns on municipal bonds.'3 The two later cases of Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. WisconsW 4 and Macallen Co. v.
Massachusetts'5 refused to uphold franchise taxes measured by gross
and net income respectively where such income represented receipts
from United States securities. In effect the decisions deny significance
to the tenuous distinction between a tax on a subject and a tax meas-
ured by it, but the court refuses to carry its realism to the extent of
considering the practical effect of the tax on the federal borrowing
power judged by the degree of encroachment. Furthermore, the
true significance of both cases is obscured by an attempt to avoid the
appearance of overruling previous cases by laying down spurious
tests to reconcile them. The vice of the tax in the Northwestern case
is declared to be that it is measured by gross income. Obviously the
federal agency is just as surely, if not as substantially, touched when
the measure is net income.1 The Macallen case is said to rest on
the differentiating fact that the legislative history of the tax disclosed
that it was passed for the specific purpose of taxing federal bonds,
whereas no sinister legislative intent is disclosed in the other cases
of this class.' 7 And unfortunately the Educational Films case dis-
tinguishes the Macallen case on this ground.' 8  Bad faith on the part
of the legislature affects in no way the fact or the degree of en-
" Provident Institution v. Mass., 6 Wall. 611 (1867) ; Society for Savings
v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594 (1867); Hamilton Co. v. Mass., 6 Wall. 632 (1867);
Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593, 33 L. ed.
1025 (1889). -
"Flint v. 5tone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. ed. 389
(1910).
11275 U. S. 136, 48 Sup. Ct. 55, 72 L. ed. 202 (1927).
279 U. S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct. 432, 73 L. ed. 875 (1928). See the following
comments: T. R. Powell, The Macallen Case-and Before (1930) 8 N. I. T.
M. 47, ibid. 91; (1930) 25 ILl. L. Rav. 103; Note (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 280.
" For. an argument that the distinction between gross and net income as a
measure of franchise taxes is well taken see (1929) 15 CourN. L. Q. 127.
"? This test appears also in Miller v. Milwaukee, supra note 8.
"Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, supra note 2.
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croachment. Both suggested differentiations seem a resort to judicial
duplicity in order that there may be created what Jerome Frank in
his recent brilliant book has called "illusory certainty in law."' 9
The actual effect of the Educational Films case seems to be to re-
instate franchise taxes measured by income constituted of returns
from federal instrumentalities. 20 It is to be regretted that the opin-
ion professes approval of the conceptualistic test developed in 1867
and the legislative motive test of the Macallen case. Language in the
majority opinion,21 however, coupled with previous expressions of
the individual judges constituting the majority22 suggests that per-
haps the ratio decidendi of the opinion is that the tax is not a sub-
stantial burden on the efficient functioning of the federal govern-
ment.
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, JJ., dissented in the Long and Mac-
dlen cases to express their approval of the income and franchise
taxes there involved. With them are now joined Hughes, C. J., and
Roberts, J., to make up the majority which approves the tax in the
'FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) 196.
"For example, the California court recently upheld on the authority of the
Educational Films case a franchise tax levied under an act expressly declaring
that no deductions in computing net income should be allowed for returns from
Federal bonds. The Pacific Co. Ltd. v. Johnson, 6 U. S. Daily 346 (Calif.
1931). A probable further effect is to make safe the state taxation of national
banks pursuant to 12 U. S. C. Supp, III §548 (1929) (provides for state excise
taxes on national banks measured by net income from all sources). Where
the bank's capital was invested in U. S. securities, the Macallen case would
perhaps prohibit this state tax. Under the Educational Films case there seems
no such likelihood.
"Per Stone, J., in Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, supra note 2, at 173:
"This court, in drawing the line which defines the limits of the powers and
instrumentalities of state and national governments, is not intent upon a
mechanicil application of the rule that governmental instrumentalities are im-
mune from taxation, regardless of the consequences to the operations of gov-
ernment. ... Having in mind the end sought, we cannot say . . . that the
present tax, viewed in the light of actualities, imposes any such real or direct
burden on the federal government as to call for the application of a different
rule."
Holmes, J., dissenting (Brandeis and Stone, JJ., concurring) in Panhandle
Co. v. Miss., 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 72 L. ed. 857 (1928): "The power
to tax is not the power to destroy while this court sits. . . . The question of
interference with government, I repeat, is one of reasonableness and degree,
and it seems to me that the interference in this case is too remote." Stone, J.,
dissenting (Brandeis and Holmes JJ., concurring) in Macallen Co. v. Mass,,
supra note 15, at 637: "It would seem that only considerations of public policy
of weight, which appear to be here wholly wanting, would justify overturning
a principle (allowability of franchise tax measured by income from tax exempt
securities) so long established. It has survived a great war, financed by the
sale of government obligations; and it has never even been suggested that in
any practical way it has impaired either the dignity or credit of the national
government."
OPEN COURT
Educationl Films case. The changed personnel of the court is a
strong indication that probably the instant North Carolina case is
based on an authority of which the majority of the court now dis-
approves. Under the realistic approach which it seems the present
tendency of this majority to follow the tax in the North Carolina
case would perhaps be sustained as only a negligible impairment of
the operations of the national government. Especially is this true
in the light of the concession even by the minority of the court that
the function of granting patents is not "a vital power of the federal
government."23
JAmEs H. CHADBOURN.
OPEN COURT
CONSOLIDATION OF COUNTY AND CITY GOVERNMENTS
The principal purpose in establishing counties is to make effectual
the political organization and civil administration of the state, in
respect to its general purposes and policy which require local direc-
tion, over matters of local finance, education, provisions for the poor,
the establishment and maintenance of highways and bridges, and, in
large measure, the administration of public justice.
A municipal corporation is an organized body, consisting of the
inhabitants of a designated area of contiguous territory, established
by the Legislature of the State with or without the consent of such
inhabitants, and constituting a legal entity with perpetual succession
under its corporate name, and having the power to own and hold
property, to select its own offices, to levy and collect taxes and
appropriate and expend the funds thus raised, to enact and enforce
police regulations within such area, and confers upon the individuals
of which it is composed, powers, privileges and immunities which
they would not otherwise possess.
The consolidation of counties and municipal corporations has
been attempted outside of North Carolina-the cities of Baltimore
and Memphis are said to be coterminous with the counties in which
they lie-and it might be well to consider whether it can be done in
this state. In the absence of constitutional restrictions, it is gen-
erally considered that the power of a state Legislature over the
boundaries of the political subdivisions of the state, is absolute, and
';Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, supra note 2, at 174.
